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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-2751
____________
UGORJI O. UGORJI,
Appellant
v.
NEW JERSEY ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE TRUST;
ROBERT BRIANT, Chairman of the Board, New Jersey
Environmental Infrastructure Trust; DENNIS HART, Executive
Director, New Jersey Environmental Infrastructure Trust;
FRANK SCANGARELLA, Chief Operating Officer, New Jersey
Environmental Infrastructure Trust

_____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. No. 1-08-cv-05424)
District Judge: The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 23, 2013
_____________

Before: RENDELL and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges,
and ROSENTHAL*, District Judge

*

The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Texas, sitting by designation.

(Opinion Filed: June 18, 2013)
_____________
OPINION
_____________

ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
Dr. Ugorji O. Ugorji, who is African-American and from Nigeria, sued his
employer, the New Jersey Environmental Infrastructure Trust (―NJEIT‖), alleging race
and national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (―Title
VII‖), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17. Ugorji also sued the chair of the NJEIT board of
trustees,1 the executive director, and the chief operating officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Ugorji appeals the District Court‘s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and the
entry of final judgment dismissing his claims. We will affirm for substantially the same
reasons stated by the District Court in its well-reasoned decision.
I.
Background
Ugorji began working for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(―DEP‖) in 1986 and for the NJEIT in 1996. At the NJEIT, he was classified as an
Administrative Assistant 2, a clerical position. Ugorji frequently told his supervisors that
he was interested in promotion to a managerial position and in assuming additional

1

This defendant died while the appeal was pending.
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responsibilities. Ugorji pointed to his doctoral degree (in educational administration) and
work experience in support of his requests.
In January 2007, the NJEIT hired Frank Scangarella as its Chief Operating
Officer. Ugorji reported to Scangarella. Soon after Scangarella began working, Ugorji
asked him for a promotion or reclassification to a managerial position. Scangarella
responded that because he had recently become COO and had supervised Ugorji for only
a short time, he did not have enough information to decide whether to grant Ugorji‘s
request. Scangarella told Ugorji that he would support reclassification if Ugorji‘s job
duties did not match his current classification. Scangarella suggested that Ugorji either
request an external ―desk audit‖—a study to determine whether his job classification
accurately reflected his duties—or provide Scangarella with other information showing
he was improperly classified.
In June 2007, before taking either step Scangarella suggested, Ugorji filed an
internal complaint alleging discrimination in the failure to grant him a promotion or give
him additional assignments that he believed himself qualified to perform. Scangarella,
who also served as the NJEIT‘s Affirmative Action Officer, investigated Ugorji‘s
complaint and found it without basis. The NJEIT board chair, Robert Briant, relied on
that investigation and concluded that the NJEIT had not discriminated against Ugorji.
In September 2007, Ugorji requested a desk audit by the New Jersey Department
of Personnel (―DOP‖). The desk audit included interviews with Ugorji and Scangarella
3

and a review of Ugorji‘s job duties. In January 2008, the DOP issued a preliminary
finding that Ugorji should be reclassified as an Administrative Analyst 1, a managerial
position.
Scangarella wrote a letter to the DOP dated February 13, 2008, disagreeing with
its decision to reclassify Ugorji. The letter stated that Ugorji ―currently does not perform
[the] functions [of an Administrative Analyst 1]‖ and that he ―is subject to close
supervision and frequent direction by the COO.‖
In a March 20, 2008 letter, the DOP issued its final decision reclassifying Ugorji
as an Administrative Analyst 1. The DOP gave the NJEIT the option of maintaining
Ugorji‘s Administrative Assistant 2 classification by taking away the job duties that had
led to the reclassification.

In response, the NJEIT revised Ugorji‘s employment

agreement to specify duties appropriate for an Administrative Assistant 2 but not an
Administrative Analyst 1. Based on these changes, the DOP reclassified Ugorji back to
an Administrative Assistant 2. Ugorji alleged that the NJEIT discriminated against him
when it failed to promote him and opposed his reclassification to a managerial position.
Ugorji also contended that he was subjected to other discriminatory acts between
2006 and 2010. In December 2006, Dennis Hart reassigned Ugorji to an office that was
noisy, moldy, and without windows. That lasted until January 2009, when Ugorji was
provided a different office, with windows, after he presented a doctor‘s note about the
effects of the interior office on his health. Ugorji alleged that after the DOP‘s first desk
4

audit, Scangarella belittled his skills, contributions, and work product, and that after
Ugorji refused to sign the revised list of his job duties, Scangarella yelled at him. Ugorji
contended that Scangeralla discriminated against him on several other occasions,
including by following him outside the work area in a harassing manner; ordering Ugorji
to remove a bag he had brought to work because Scangarella believed it contained a
personal laptop; requiring Ugorji to reorganize his office furniture so that his computer
monitor faced the door; checking documents Ugorji was scanning or holding to see if
they were in fact work-related; and confiscating a space heater from Ugorji‘s office.
In November 2008, Ugorji filed this suit. While it was pending, he requested a
second desk audit and reclassification to a managerial position.

The NJEIT again

opposed Ugorji‘s reclassification request. The successor agency to the DOP, the New
Jersey Civil Service Commission (―CSC‖), did the desk audit and found that Ugorji was
properly classified as an Administrative Assistant 2.

The NJEIT offered Ugorji

additional work responsibilities, including working on the NJEIT‘s newspaper and a
reclassification to the position of Senior Standards and Procedures Technician, but Ugorji
declined those offers.
In his third amended complaint, Ugorji alleged that the NJEIT and the individual
defendants, Briant, Hart, and Scangarella, were liable for race and national origin
discrimination under Title VII and § 1983. After discovery, the defendants moved for
summary judgment. The District Court granted that motion.
5

II.
The Legal Standard
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court‘s decision
granting summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d
173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007).

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant

demonstrates ―that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm the

District Court on any ground supported by the record. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798,
805 (3d Cir. 2000).

III.
Discussion
A.
The District Court granted summary judgment on Ugorji‘s Title VII claims against
the NJEIT on the ground that it had fewer than 15 employees during the relevant period.
Title VII defines an ―employer‖ as ―a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding year . . . .‖

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

An

―industry affecting commerce‖ includes ―any governmental industry, business, or
activity.‖

Id., § 2000e(h).

A ―person‖ includes ―one or more . . . governments,
6

governmental agencies, [or] political subdivisions . . . .‖ Id., § 2000e(a).
Ugorji argues that the 15-employee statutory requirement does not apply to public
employers and, alternatively, that the NJEIT and DEP should be considered a single
entity.

As to the first argument, Title VII‘s 15-employee requirement does not

distinguish between public and private employers. Ugorji argues that a Tenth Circuit
opinion, Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1980), suggests that public employers
are exempt from the 15-employee requirement. In Owens, the court held that when an
employee sues an employee or agent of a political subdivision, such as a county, the court
should count all of the subdivision‘s employees in determining whether the 15-employee
threshold is satisfied. Id. at 287. The Owens court did not hold that the 15-employee
requirement was inapplicable. Owens does not support the argument that employees
outside the state agency (or, in that case, political subdivision) sued are to be counted in
deciding whether it is a Title VII ―employer.‖ Cf. Laurie v. Ala. Ct. Crim. Appeals, 256
F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a state court‘s employees cannot be
aggregated with employees of other courts or state agencies to meet the Title VII 15employee requirement).
Ugorji‘s second argument, that the District Court should have considered the
NJEIT and DEP as a single employer in deciding whether the 15-employee threshold was
met, also lacks support. This Court has previously held that two corporate entities should
be considered a single employer when: (1) one entity split itself into separate entities with
7

fewer than 15 employees to evade Title VII liability; (2) one entity directed another
entity‘s discriminatory acts; or (3) the entities are so interconnected that they collectively
caused the alleged discriminatory employment practice. Nesbit v. Gears Unlim., Inc.,
347 F.3d 72, 85–87 (3d Cir. 2003). Ugorji did not point to record evidence of the first
two elements. Instead, he contends that the DEP and NJEIT are interrelated in ways that
make them a single entity.
―[S]ubstantive consolidation is an equitable remedy and is difficult to achieve.‖
Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 86. In deciding whether entities should be substantively consolidated,
we apply an ―open-ended, equitable inquiry,‖ looking to the following nonexclusive
factors: (1) ―the degree of unity between the entities with respect to ownership,
management (both directors and officers), and business functions (e.g., hiring and
personnel matters)‖; (2) ―whether they present themselves as a single company such that
third parties dealt with them as one unit‖; (3) ―whether a parent company covers the
salaries, expenses, or losses of its subsidiary‖; and (4) ―whether one entity does business
exclusively with the other.‖ Id. at 87.
Ugorji points out that the DEP provides personnel, payroll, and training services
and handles labor relations for the NJEIT, and that the DEP‘s commissioner is an ex
officio member of the NJEIT‘s board of directors, under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:11B–4(b).
Ugorji also notes that it was the DEP that managed his desk audit requests. We agree
with the District Court that Ugorji did not point to record evidence giving rise to a
8

genuine factual dispute material to determining whether the NJEIT and DEP should be
viewed as a single entity for Title VII purposes. The statute creating the NJEIT states:
―[t]here is established in, but not of, the Department of Environmental Protection a body
corporate and politic, with corporate succession, to be known as the [NJEIT].‖ N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 58:11B–4(a) (emphasis added). The NJEIT and DEP are separate entities under
state law. While the DEP may provide some services to the NJEIT, that is not ordinarily
sufficient for substantive consolidation.

Ugorji has not pointed to other evidence

supporting an inference that the two agencies ―are so interconnected that they collectively
caused the alleged discriminatory employment practice.‖

Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 86.

Summary judgment was properly granted for the NJEIT on Ugorji‘s Title VII claim.2
Considering that claim on the merits does not alter the result.
B.
Claims for an equal protection violation based on race and national origin under §
1983, like a disparate treatment claim under Title VII, require a plaintiff to prove
intentional discrimination. See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 169
(3d Cir. 2013) (Title VII); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524,

2

The individual defendants cannot be held liable under Title VII. See Le v. Univ.
of Pa., 321 F.3d 403, 408 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (―‗Congress did not intend to hold individual
employees liable under Title VII.‘‖ (quoting Sheridan v. EI DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc))).
9

543–44 (3d Cir. 2011) (equal protection).3

Because Ugorji has not provided direct

evidence of discrimination, his claims are governed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d
261, 270 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying McDonnell Douglas to an equal protection claim
brought under § 1981). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Ugorji had the initial
burden of making a prima facie showing of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802. The burden then shifted to the defendants to ―articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason‖ for their actions. Id. The burden then returned to Ugorji to
raise a factual dispute as to whether the legitimate reasons the defendants proffered were
a pretext or whether discrimination was among the motives for the challenged
employment action. See Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426–27 (3d Cir. 2013).
Ugorji claims that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his
race and national origin by failing to promote him or support his request for
reclassification to a managerial position.4

The defendants proffered several

3

Ugorji does not allege or argue that ―the discrimination he suffered was pursuant
to an official policy or custom‖ of the NJEIT. McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554
F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2009). His § 1983 claims appear to be made solely against the
individual defendants.
4

A prima facie case of discrimination requires a showing of an adverse
employment action. Burton, 707 F.3d at 426. An adverse employment action is ―‗a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.‘‖ Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152–53
(3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
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nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions. The defendants stated that they opposed
reclassifying Ugorji‘s job title because they believed that the Administrative Assistant 2
title accurately reflected his duties. The defendants also stated that they did not need
anyone, including Ugorji, performing the duties of an Administrative Analyst 1.
To raise a factual dispute as to discrimination, Ugorji ―must point to some
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1)
disbelieve the employer‘s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer‘s action.‖ Burton, 707 F.3d at 427 (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759,
764 (3d Cir. 1994)). One approach is to point to evidence ―that the employer treated
other, similarly situated persons not of his protected class more favorably.‖ Fuentes, 32
F.3d at 765. Evidence of disparate treatment must show that a comparator was similarly
situated to the plaintiff ―in ‗all relevant respects.‘‖ Keystone Redev. Partners LLC v.
Decker, 631 F.3d 89, 109 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10
(1992)). ―In order to determine who might qualify as a similarly situated employee we
must look to the job function, level of supervisory responsibility and salary, as well as
other factors relevant to the particular workplace.‖ Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co.,
Ugorji‘s allegations that the defendants assigned him to a noisy, moldy office without
windows; belittled his skills, contributions, and work product; followed and yelled at
him; ordered him to remove a bag he brought to work; required him to reorganize his
office furniture; checked documents he was holding; and confiscated a space heater from
his office are not adverse employment actions that give rise to a damages claim under
Title VII or § 1983.
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359 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 2004). The District Court found that the individuals Ugorji
identified as comparators held very different jobs than his, and that the record did not
include their personnel files, resumes, or other admissible sources of information about
their responsibilities, experience, and qualifications. On appeal, Ugorji argues that the
District Court erred in finding that the evidence as to these employees did not defeat
summary judgment.
Ugorji first points to evidence that the NJEIT supported reclassification efforts by
Mary Claire D‘Andrea, a white employee. Unlike Ugorji, D‘Andrea was a managementlevel employee and former acting NJEIT Executive Director. Ugorji has failed to point
to evidence showing that he and D‘Andrea were similarly situated in any relevant respect
aside from requesting a desk audit. The promotion or reclassification of one employee
but not another, when those employees have different job responsibilities, qualifications,
and experience and their promotion or reclassification would fill different needs within
the organization, does not create or support an inference of discrimination.
Ugorji also pointed to Josephine Manzo, a white NJEIT employee who was
promoted to the position of Senior Standards and Procedures Technician. But in 2011,
the NJEIT offered to support Ugorji‘s reclassification to this same position, which would
have increased his salary and reduced his work hours. Ugorji turned this offer down
because the NJEIT refused to recommend a reclassification to Administrative Analyst 1
or Community Relations Manager, positions that would have paid him an even higher
12

salary and given him management responsibilities. The NJEIT‘s promotion of another
employee to a job that Ugorji was also offered does not support an inference that the
NJEIT treated Manzo more favorably than Ugorji.
Ugorji finally argues that the District Court failed to consider his argument that
another NJEIT employee, Trudy Edinger, was assigned responsibilities of an Alternative
Affirmative Action Officer and was promoted to Executive Assistant 3, a clerical
position. Ugorji asserts that he was qualified for promotion to the Affirmative Action
Officer position, but he does not point to evidence of Edinger‘s qualifications or
experience. There is no basis for an inference that Ugorji and Edinger were similarly
situated or that her promotion evidences discrimination against Ugorji.
C.
Ugorji argues that he had alleged a hostile work environment claim under Title
VII and that the defendants failed to move for summary judgment on that claim.
Although his third amended complaint mentions ―abusive conduct in the workplace,‖
Ugorji asserts only a single general count of discrimination under Title VII.

The

defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Ugorji‘s Title VII claims. At no point
did Ugorji assert before the District Court that he had additional claims that were not
covered by the motion. Ugorji did not clearly allege a hostile work environment claim,
see Doe ex rel. Thomas v. Tsai, 648 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2011), and the defendants
moved for summary judgment on all the claims Ugorji asserted.
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IV.
Conclusion
We will affirm the District Court‘s judgment.
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